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A methodology for the ensured security of a workstation connected in a computer network
with in an organization is presented. A technique for the determination of the required security
level for a workstation's tangible and intangible components is described. A set of security
measures for each security level of the workstation's tangible and intangible components is
selected. The methodology is applied to workstations in the computer network of a Slovenian
state agency. The required security levels for the workstation's tangible and intangible
components are determined. Two sets of security measures corresponding to security levels
determinedfor both types of the Agency's workstation components arelisted.
Keywords: workstation, computer network, security, physical threats, logical threats,
countermeasures.
1. INTRODUCTION
Nowadays, computer networks have become an integral part of business. A
security breach of a computer network within an organization can result in loss of
revenue, loss of productivity, the cost of new hardware or software, loss of customer
confidence, legal and contractual fees, etc. Workstation security is an essential part of
the overall security of the network. Unauthorized access to the system through a
workstation represents one of the biggest security threats to the computer network.
In the literature, workstation security is usually treated as a part of network
security. Possible security risks presented by the workstations and those features of
security protection which address those risks are discussed, sometimes in detail (see
e.g. [2], [3]). However, these authors do not allow for disparity among the sensitivity
of assets within the different networks which result in the different consequences of
potential security threats. We mu st bear in mind that workstations connected to
different networks require a different level of security protection.
In princip le, specific security meas ures for any particular workstation can be
defined in the framework of conventional risk analysis (see e.g. [9]). Risk analysis
involves the definition and evaluation of sensitive system assets, the identification and
evaluation of possible security threats, and an assessment of asset vulnerability to a
given security threat. Usually, it is very difficult to collect all the data needed for an
efficient risk analysis. Data on the likelihood of a threat occurring, and data on the
potential losses following such an occurrence are often not available. Therefore,
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recommendations for choosing the security measures corresponding to different classes
of sensitivity of system assets would be of great help.
It is desirable to define the number of different security levels of a workstation
according to the different sensitivity levels of system data. Each level of workstation
security requires a different set of protective measures. Such an approach was used in
the American military publication Department of Defence Trusted Computer System
Evaluation Criteria known as the "Orange Book" [5]. The "Orange Book" states that
the lower the discrepancy between the maximum sensitivity level of activities on a
system and the minimum clearance of any user of the system, the lower the level of
security required. The rationale behind this is that the threat of users with a low
security clearance gaining access to highly sensitive information is more serious than
any other threat. Bhaskar (see [1]) adapted these concepts to be applicable in the office
environment and developed a method for the determination of workstation security
levels. For each workstation security level, he presented the guidelines for workstation
security protection. Among possible security threats, he took into account only
unauthorized access to the workstation.
In this paper, we will describe a methodology for defining measures against
security threats to the workstation connected to the computer network within an
organization. Our methodology represents a modification of Bhaskar's methodology.
Apart from logical security threats, physical threats were also taken into account. The
methodology will be applied to the workstations of the computer network within a
Slovenian state agency.
2. DESCRlPTION OF A WORKSTATION AND ITS COMPONENTS
A workstation is defined as a computer (an intelligent terminal or personal
computer) connected to a computer network (Jocal area network (LAN), wide area
network (WAN) or metropolitan area network (MAN)). Apart from workstations, a
computer network contains a mainframe or a number of computers providing specific
services called servers (e.g. file server, security server, communication server, etc.).
A workstation's function includes:
o Interacting with the user through a graphical interface
o Preparing the user's request through standard interfaces for accessing the server
o Communicating with the server over a communication interface
o Performing analysis on the data received from the server to be presented to the
user
Workstation components can be divided into two categories: tangible and
intangible components. Tangible components are used to contain or to support
intangible components. Tangible components include physical storage devices (disks
or tapes), and other computer hardware (processors, memory boards, video screens,
etc.). Intangible components are the following logical entities: the main memory
contents (operating system and currently executing program with its working data), the
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user profile or account and the contents of the physical storage devices (files and
directories ),
3. THREATS TO WORKSTATION SECURITY
We have used the following definition of a security threat [12]: A security threat is
any potential event or act that could cause one or more of the following to occur:
unauthorized disclosure, destruction, removal, modification or interruption of sensitive
information, assets or services, or injury to people. Threats to computer security can be
grouped into two broad categories: physical threats and logical threats. Physical threats
affect the actual existence and physical conditions of the computer facilities, and
(indirectly) the data stored in the affected facilities. A logical threat is an intentional or
unintentional activity affecting data stored or transmitted by the computer system.
Physical threats can damage or destroy only workstation components (tangible and
intangible), while logical threats can affect the intangible components of the whole
computer network within an organization. Through a workstation an intruder can
access and misuse sensitive information stored in other computers in the network.
Workstation components should be protected against security threats by the
implementation of adequate protective measures. Protective measures serve four basic
purposes: avoidance, prevention, detection and recovery. Avoidance means simply not
exposing workstation components to threats. Tasks should be organized so that threats
can be avoided. Prevention includes hardware and software security functions,
management controls as well as setting up and enforcing security policies. Detection
seeks to discover misuse while it is occurring or after the fact. It serves four purposes:
it deters misuse, allows the detection of a threat occurrence in time to reduce the
damage, allows the identification of the perpetrators and reveals the vulnerabilities.
Recovery includes restoring the damaged resources and trying to remove the
vulnerabilities that allowed a security breach.
The selection of cost-effective protective measures against logical threats to a
workstation's intangible components, and against physical threats to a workstation's
tangible components depends on the sensitivity of the data stored in the system. Higher
sensitivity data requires a stronger logical as well as a stronger physical protection.
When a workstation is adequately protected against physical threats, logical threats
cannot take place.
4. A METHODOLOGY FOR WORKSTATION SECURITY ENSURANCE
We will determine a number of security levels for a workstation connected to the
computer network within an organization using the technique described in [1]. For
each security level, we will analyze security requirements and select a set of
appropriate protective measures against physical and logical threats to workstation
components. We will not consider cabling and communication channels.
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4.1. Security level for a workstation's intangible components
The process of detennining the proper security level for the intangible components
of a workstation within a given network (system) is divided into two distinct steps:
1. The sensitivity levels of all activities on the system and the clearance levels of
any user of the system are defined. Then the maximum sensitivity level and the
minimum clearance level are detennined.
2. The maximum sensitivity level and the minimum user clearance level assigned
in Step 'I are used to detennine the required security level for the intangible
workstation components.
Step 1
The sensitivity levels for system activities and user clearance levels are expressed
on the same scale as shown in Table 1.







The meaning of the sensitivity levels of system activities from Table 1 is:
U - applies to activities involving data that is not sensitive or classified;
R - applies to activities (usually of a routine or non-strategic nature) involving data
which has a definite requirement for non-disclosure, the destruction or
corruption of which may cause losses, inconvenience or embarrassment to the
organization;
C - applies to activities involving low or medium level strategic infonnation or
infonnation on significant sums of money, the unauthorized disclosure ofwhich
could reasonably be expected to cause damage to the business;
S - applies to activities involving information on large sums of money or high level
strategic infonnation, the unauthorized disclosure of which could reasonably be
expected to cause serious damage to the business;
TS - applies to activities involving infonnation that is of crucial importance to
organization strategy or security, the unauthorized disclosure of which could
reasonably be expected to cause exceptionally grave damage to the business.
The meaning ofuser clearance levels from Table 1 is:
U - applies to persons with no clearance or authorization, access would only be
permitted to infonnation for which there are no specified controls;
R - applies to persons who have authorized access to certain sensitive information
of a routine non-strategic nature, for official use only;
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C - applies to persons who are allowed access to certain low or medium level
strategic information or to other information the knowledge of which might, if
divulged, cause increased security threats;
S - applies to persons who are allowed access to high level strategic information, on
a need to know basis;
TS - applies to persons with the need to know information of crucial importanee to
either strategy or security.
Step 2
Determination of the required security level for a workstation's intangible
components depends on the result of Step 1 and on whether the system is an open or a
closed one. The classification of a system as either open or closed depends on whether
it is adequately protected against the introduction of malicious logic (virus, Trojan
horse, etc.). Malicious logic is created mainly by application developers or
maintainers. In a closed system these persons have sufficient clearance and
authorization to justify the presumption that they have not introduced malicious logic.
They should have the same clearance level as the most sensitive data, where the
maximum data sensitivity level is confidential or below, or at least a secret clearance,
where the maximum data sensitivity level is secret or top secret. The system is open,
when the clearance levels of application developers and maintainers are lower than
those described above.
In Tables 2 and 3, security levels for intangible workstation components in open
and closed systems are given for all possible combinations of minimum clearanee and
maximum sensitivity levels.




U R C S TS
U 1 4 5 6 7
R 1 3 4 5 6
C 1 2 3 4 5
S 1 2 2 3 4
TS I 2 2 2 3
Minimum





U R C S TS
U 1 3 4 5 6
R 1 2 3 4 5
C 1 2 2 3 4
S I 2 2 2 3
TS I I 1 1 2
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4.2. Security level for a workstation's tangible components
When determining the required security level for a workstation's tangible
components, only the sensitivity level of system activities has to be considered.
Countermeasures against physical threats do not depend on the clearance levels of
authorized users or on whether the system is open or closed one. The security level for
a workstation's tangible components corresponds to the maximum sensitivity level of
system activities (see Table 4).




Security measures for a workstation's tangible components were grouped according
to the type of physical threat. We used this categorization because the occurrence of
any physical threat causes damage or destruction of the tangible component affected,
independently of the tangible component type. Therefore, it is the type of physical
threat that determines the protective measures required. We have considered the
following types of physical threat: fire, rising water, falling water, hardware and
software failures, lightning or power defects and physical malicious acts by an
intruder. In order to find appropriate measures against each physical threat, we
examined abundant literature on computer physical security (see e.g. [3], [6], [7], [8]).
For each security level determined previously, we selected a set ofmeasures against a
given physical threat to a workstation's tangible components.
Security measures for intangible components were grouped according to the type
of intangible component because logical threats affect different types of intangible
component differently. In formulating of the sets of countermeasures corresponding to
each security level for intangible components, we relied on guidelines published in [1]
and the literature from [2], [4] and [10].
5. APPLICATION OF THE METHODOLOGY TO A WORKSTATION IN THE
COMPUTER NETWORK WITHIN A SLOVENIAN STATE AGENCY
The security methodology described in the previous section was applied to the
workstations of a Slovenian state agency (in the following text "Agency") working in
the field of social security. The Agency consists of the headquarters and 12 off-site
branches. There are over 400 workstations at the Agency's headquarters and 25 - 30
workstations at each of the Agency's branches. Workstations at the headquarters are
connected to the host computer via aLAN, while workstations at the off-site branches
use the X.25 network.
The Agency's computer network handles persona I data about a great number of
Slovenian citizens. Unauthorized disclosure of this data could affect citizens' privacy,
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which is protected by Slovenian law (see [11D. Therefore, aside from the
confidentiality of strategic business information, the confidentiality of citizens'
personal data must also be ensured. On the other hand, the unavailability or corruption
of citizens' data can influence their incomes and burden the Agency with the cost of
restoration of data lost or damaged. Consequently, the availability and integrity of
citizens' data are also important.
In the following text we will determine security levels for the tangible and
intangible components of a typical workstation in the Agency's computer network and
propose a set of safeguards against physical and logical security threats.
5.1. Determination of security levels for workstation components
Step 1 of the methodology described in section 4 comprises the deterrnination of
the Agency's main activities, a definition of the users of the Agency's computer
network, and the assignment of respective sensitivity and clearance levels. The resuits
of Step 1 are shown in Tables 5 and 6.
It can be seen from Tables 5 and 6 that for the system observed, the maximum
sensitivity level is C and the minimum clearance level is U.
In Step 2, we derived the security levels for both types of workstation components.
The Agency's computer network was classified as a closed system because application
programmers and maintainers have sufficient clearance (see Tables 5 and 6). Taking
into account the resuits of Step 1 and Tables 3 and 4, the security levels were
deterrnined to be 3 for the workstation's tangible components, and 4 for the
workstation's intangible components.
5.2. Security measures for a workstation's tangible components
At security level 3, we have recommended the following measures against security
threats to a workstation's tangible components:
Protection against fire
o The building should be constructed of fire-resistant materials or protected by a
fire-suppression system.
D The computer room should be equipped with clearly visible fire extinguishers.
D The personnel should be trained and drilled in the use offire extinguishers.
o There should be sufficient fire and smoke alarms appropriate to the
environment.
D Exits and evacuation routes should be clearly marked.
o All unnecessary sources of ignition should be eliminated or identified and
accepted.
o Ready access for fire-fighting personnel should be ensured.
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Table 5. Sensitivity levels ofmain Agency activities
Activity Sensitivity
Level
1 Clerk training U
2 Document editing U
3 Printed document acceptance or posting R
4 Customer data backup R
5 Statistical data ana1ysis R
6 Executing basic agency functions R
7 Program testing R
8 Program deyelopment and upgrading C
9 Program distribution C
la Program maintenance C
11 Data base administration C
12 System analysis C
13 Assignrnent of user access privileges C
14 Control data verification C
15 Central control of the data for executing basic agency
functions C
16 Computer system maintenance C
17 Collecting temporary data for strategic decision making C
18 Department management C







5 Project manager R
6 Operator R
7 System analyst C
8 Application programmer C
9 Program maintainer C
10 Data base administrator C
Il Computer system maintainer C
12 System programmer C
13 System manager C
14 Department manager C
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Protection against ris ing andfal/ing water
o The computer room should be located on high ground or high in the building.
o Cut-offs for any water in the ceiling should be identified, labelled and
accessible.
o The ceiling should be free ofholes or defects.
o Plastic sheeting should be available.
o Provisions should be made for fast removal ofwater from the computer room.
Protection against hardware and software fai/ures
o There should exist firm contracts concerning hardware and software purchasing
and maintenance.
o A safety stock of critical hardware components should exist.
o Software backup should be available.
o Preventive maintenance of hardware should be undertaken according to an
accepted policy.
o Corrective maintenance of hardware and software should be performed
regulariy.
o Any physical storage device should be checked daily for disk errors, bad
sectors, etc.
o Appropriate operating conditions should be ensured.
Protection against lightning or power defects
o Lightning protection devices should be installed.
o Power conditioning equipment should be installed.
Protection against any physica/ ma/icious acts by an intruder
o The workstation should be kept in a dedicated room.
o The room should be lockable by a smart card with a PIN.
o All windows to the computer room should be inaccessible from the outside.
5.3. Security measures for a workstation's intangible components
For a workstation's intangible components at security level 4, we have
recommended the following countermeasures:
Main memory contents
o An uninterruptible power supply should be install ed.
o The workstation power supply should be separated from the power supply for
other electrical equipment.
o Each user should be allowed to use only a specifed amount of the main memory
of the system.
o The system break-in keys should be disabled.
o There should be a system manager who can manage and monitor the use of the
operating system.
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o There should be an access log, recording who has accessed the system and at
what time, what has been printed out and which remote devices have been
mounted, as well as all accesses to the system and to individual files and
applications.
o A detailed audit trail should record all important transactions.
o Different classes of users should be given different privileges to perform
operating systems' functions, depending on their need to do so and on their
security clearance.
o Interactive system monitoring should be introduced. A "superuser" (security
manager, auditor, etc.) should be able to monitor system activities in real time.
o The ability to write command language procedures should ex.ist to enable
greater control and security to be programmed into the operating system.
User profile or account
o A usemame and a password should be used.
o The minimum number of characters in the password should be six.
o Passwords should be able to expire.
o There should be an auto log-off facility.
o Access to the system should be restricted by preventing users from logging-on
between certain hours.
o Remote access to the system should be controlled by a pass-code.
Contents of physical storage media
o Fixed or removable disks should be given read-only status when necessary.
o Fixed disks should be partitioned so that certain users are only allowed to
address certain areas.
o Users must be prevented from being able to read (or write onto) the disk
directly.
o Full backup of disk contents should be taken at least weekly.
o Incremental backup of disk contents should be taken at least twice daily.
o Old files should be erased with multiple overwriting.
o It should be possible to attach "create", "read", "write", "execute" and "delete"
attributes, in any combination, to a file. These capabilities should be attached on
the basis of "system manager", "owner", "group" and "world".
o Sensitive data should be encrypted.
The list of security measures presented enables an assessment and eventual
improvement of the existing security level of each Agency's workstation. Special
attention must be paid to protection against logical threats. An inadequate Ievel of
logical security at asingle workstation in the Agency represents a serious security risk
for the entire Agency's computer network.
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6. CONCLUSION
The security of workstations connected to the computer network is a very
important part of the overall security of the information system within an organization.
An adequate security level of the workstation could be achieved by introducing
appropriate measures against security threats. Selection of cost-effective protective
measures depends on the sensitivity of the data stored or processed by the computer
network. Higher sensitivity data requires stronger logical as well as stronger physical
protection.
A methodology for workstation security ensurance has been presented.
Workstation components have been divided into tangible and intangible components.
Tangible components are vulnerable to physical threats, while intangible components
are vulnerable to logical threats. We have defined five different security levels for
tangible workstation components, and seven security levels for intangible workstation
components. The security level for a workstation's tangible components depends on the
sensitivity levels of activities on the system, while the security level for a workstation's
intangible components depends on the sensitivity levels of activities on the system and
on the clearance levels of the system users.
We have selected a set of appropriate security measures for each security level of a
workstation's tangible and intangible components. Security measures for a
workstation's tangible components have been grouped according to the type of
physical threat, while security measures for the intangible components have been
classified according to the type of intangible component.
The methodology described has been applied to workstations in the computer
network of a Slovenian state agency working in the field of social security. It has been
found that security level three for tangible components of a typical Agency
workstation is required, while security level four is needed for a workstation's
intangible components. We have listed a set of security measures for both types of
workstation components.
REFERENCES
[1] K. Bhaskar. Computer Security, Threats and Countermeasures. NCC Blackwell,
Manchester, 1993.
[2] S. Cobb. PC and LAN Security. Computing McGraw-Hill, New York, 1996.
[3] P. H. Corrigan. LAN Disaster Prevention and Recovery. PTR Prentice Hall,
Englewood Cliffs, 1994.
[4] P. T. Davis. Complete LAN Security and Control. Windcrest. McGraw-Hill, New
York, 1994.
[5] DOO 5200.28-STD, Department of Defence Trusted Computer System
Evaluation Criteria. USA Department of Defense, 1985.
189
A. Hudoklin, A. Stadler. Workstation security ensurance
[6] L. J. Fennelly. Effective Physical Security. Butterworth Publishers, Stoneham,
1992.
[7] R. P. Fisher. Information Systems Security. Prentice-Hall, New Jersey, 1984.
[8] M. E. Kabay. The NCSA Guide to Enterprise Security Protecting Information
Assets. McGraw-Hill, New York, 1996.
[9] A. Reed and S. Watt. Computer Risk Manager: AManager for EDP Contingency
Planning. Elsevier, Oxford in association with Alkemi, Berkshire, 1989.
[10] R. C. Summers. Secure Computing. Computing McGraw-Hill, New York, 1997.
[11] Zakon o varstvu osebnih podatkov. Uradni list Republike Slovenije, No. 8/90,
1990.
[12] A. C. L. Zemler. Guidelines for Computer Security at CQU. Central Queensland
University, CQU Computer Security Committee, Rockhampton Queensland,
Australia, 1996.
Received: 7 June 1998
Accepted: 3 September 1998
Alenka Hudoklin
Alenka Stadler
ZAŠTITA SIGURNOSTI RADNIH STANICA
Sažetak
U članku je prikazana metodologija zaštite radne stanice od prijetnja koje utječu na sigurnost
računalne mreže u organizaciji. Komponente radne stanice podijeljene su na opipljive i
neopipljive. Opipljive komponente radne stanice uključuju eksternu memoriju (diskove,
magnetne trake, itd.) i ostali računalni hardver (procesore, ulazno-izlazne jedinice, itd.).
Neopipljive komponente radne stanice su sljedeći logični resursi: sadržaj primarne memorije
(operativni sustav, aplikativni softver s pripadajućim podatcima), profil korisnika računalne
mreže i sadržaj eksterne memorije (datoteke idirektoriji). Opipljive komponente izložene su
fizičkim prijetnjama, dok su neopipljive komponente izložene logičnim prijetnjama.
Definirano je pet različitih nivoa sigurnosti za opipljive komponenete i sedam nivoa
sigurnosti za neopipljive komponente radne stanice. Nivo sigurnosti opipljivih komponenata
radne stanice ovisi o nivou osjetljivosti aktivnosti u računalnom sustavu, dok nivo sigurnosti
neopipljivih komponenata ovisi o nivou osjetljivosti aktivnosti na sustavu i o nivou ovlaštenja
korisnika računalnog sustava. Predložen je niz zaštitnih mjera za svaki nivo sigurnosti
opipljivih i neopipljivih komponenata radne stanice. Zaštitne mjere za opipljive komponente
radne stanice grupirane su s obzirom na tip fizičke prijetnje, dok su zaštitne mjere za
neopipljive komponente klasificirane prema tipu neopipljive komponenete. Opisana
metodologija aplicirana je na radnu stanicu u računalnoj mreži jedne od državnih institucija
u Sloveniji. Određeni su potrebni nivoi sigurnosti inavedene primjerene zaštitne mjere za oba
tipa komponenata radne stanice.
Ključne riječi: radna stanica, računalna mreža, sigurnost, fizičke prijetnje, logične prijetnje,
zaštitne mjere.
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